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THESIS

RIO DE JANEIRO AND MEDELLÍN: SIMILAR CHALLENGES, DIFFERENT APPROACHES

by

David A. Yokers

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Thesis Co-Advisors: Thomas Bruneau
                                                          Cristiana Matei

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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Medellín, Colombia, are large urban cities that have struggled with public insecurity caused by illegal armed groups. Both have developed new programs to address areas of violence and parts of the cities that have become marginalized. In Brazil, the State Secretary for Public Security of Rio de Janeiro is implementing the Pacifying Police Unit program. In Colombia, the program is called the Medellín Model and originated out of the mayor's office. This thesis uses a comparative analysis to describe how each country's transition to democracy, police structure, and political structure influenced the development and shape of each program.

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RIO DE JANEIRO AND MEDELLÍN: SIMILAR CHALLENGES, DIFFERENT APPROACHES

David A. Yokers
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.A., University of Washington, 2002

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March 2016**

Approved by: Thomas Bruneau
Thesis Co-Advisor

Cristiana Matei
Thesis Co-Advisor

Mohammed Hafez
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Medellín, Colombia, are large urban cities that have struggled with public insecurity caused by illegal armed groups. Both have developed new programs to address areas of violence and parts of the cities that have become marginalized. In Brazil, the State Secretary for Public Security of Rio de Janeiro is implementing the Pacifying Police Unit program. In Colombia, the program is called the Medellín Model and originated out of the mayor's office. This thesis uses a comparative analysis to describe how each country's transition to democracy, police structure, and political structure influenced the development and shape of each program.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AUC   Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces)

BOPE   Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (Special Police Operations Battalion)

CEDEZO   Centros de Desarrollo Empresarial Zonal (Zonal Business Development Centers)

CEPAR   Centro de Formación para la Paz y la Reconciliación (Training Center for Peace and Reconciliation)

CP   Policia Civil (Civil Police)

ELN   Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army)

FARC   Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)

GINI   Generalized Inequality Index

HDI   Human Development Index

HRB   Human Rights Board

LGC   Local Governance Committee

MP   Policia Militar (Military Police)

NGO   nongovernmental organization

PUI   Proyecto Urbano Integral (Integral Urban Project)

QLSI   Quality of Life Survey Index

SENA   Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje (National Learning Service)

SISC   Sistema de Información de Seguridad y Convivencia (System for Security and Coexistence)

UPP   Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Pacifying Police Unit)

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I.   INTRODUCTION

A.   MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Medellín, Colombia, are both large urban cities challenged by crime and public insecurity.[1] In view of the challenge posed by public insecurity, the two cities have adopted seemingly dissimilar approaches to cope with crime. Brazil has implemented the Pacifying Police Unit (UPP) program, which is based on the assumption that the police needed to retake the territory of the *favelas*, the city's slums, to reestablish physical security before social issues could be addressed.[2] By contrast, Colombia has adopted the so-called Medellín Model, which is based mostly on a societal, bottom-up approach to address the social issues that contribute to crime and insecurity, such as poverty, lack of education, marginalization.[3] This thesis aims to compare and contrast both anti-crime programs. How different are they? How did they evolve? If they are indeed different, why did both cities adopt such different approaches to a similar challenge (public insecurity and crime)?

B.   IMPORTANCE

Public security has increasingly become a major issue of concern in many Latin American countries.[4] In this context, specific sectors of Brazil and Colombia have been

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[1] "City Population by Sex, City and City Type," accessed December 10, 2013, http://data.un.org/Data. aspx?d=PO&f=tableCode%3A240.

[2] Leandro Piquet Carneiro, "The Politics of Pacification in Rio de Janeiro: A Study in Leadership and Innovation" (working paper, Lemann Dialogue, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2012), http://nupps.usp.br/downloads/relatorio/Anexo_34_Piquet_for_Lehman_Seminar _Pacification_Policy_jan_13.pdf; Pacifying Police Unit, "About," accessed September 1, 2013; http://www.upprj.com/index.php/o_que_e_upp_us.

[3] Agency of Cooperation and Investment of Medellín and the Metropolitan Area-ACI, "Introduction: Medellín: A Model of Integral Social Development and a Laboratory City," in *Medellín Laboratory: An Exhibit of Ten Ongoing Practices*, ed. Miguel Mesa (Medellín: Agencia de Cooperacion e Inversion de Medellín y el Area Metropolitana, 2011), 22–23.

[4] Marcelo Bergman and Laurence Whitehead, ed., *Criminality, Public Security, and the Challenge to Democracy in Latin America* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 1–2; Niels Uildriks, "Police Reform, Security, and Human Rights in Latin America: An Introduction," in *Policing Insecurity: Police Reform, Security, and Human Rights in Latin America*, ed. Niels Uildriks (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), 4–5.

greatly affected by organized crime and insecurity.[5] For instance, from 1996 to 2006, Rio de Janeiro reported an average homicide rate of 50 per 100,000, which is well above the national average of 30 per 100,000.[6] The government is now attempting to address the challenges faced by those who live in Rio de Janeiro's *favelas* through the implementation of UPPs, which were first instituted in 2008.[7] Likewise, in 1991, Medellín had a homicide rate of 391 per 100,000, which was nearly four times the national average.[8] Since then, the homicide rate has dropped to 55 per 100,000 in 2010, a reduction that has been partially attributed to the so-called Medellín model.[9]

An examination of public security models in Latin America is relevant for a number of reasons. First, most of the public policy programs, such as those instituted in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, have coincided with the expansion of democracy, welfare, and the middle class.[10] In other words, governmental decisions on how to tackle crime have been shaped by a number of new political and societal factors, including democratization and demographic changes. In this thesis, a comparative study of Rio de Janeiro's and Medellín's anti-crime program can help identify the conditions under which societal factors can shape policy outcomes. Indeed, this thesis analyzes why the Medellín model is often perceived as a bottom-up approach to public security.

Second, as previously indicated, although the challenges posed by crime are similar, the responses by governments and public administrations in the region are not.

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[5] Mark Ungar, *Policing Democracy: Overcoming Obstacles to Citizen Security in Latin America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 2.

[6] Enrique Desmond Arias, *Drugs and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro: Trafficking, Social Networks, and Public Security* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 1; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Global Study on Homicide: Trends, Contexts, Data," 2011, 78, http://www.unodc.org/ documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf.

[7] Pacifying Police Unit, "About" and "History," accessed August 26, 2013, http://www.upprj.com/ index.php/historico_us.

[8] Myriam Merchan Bonnilla and Oscar Arcos Palma, "Strategy for the Territorialization of Security. Making Medellín Safer: Together We Can," in *Medellín Laboratory: An Exhibit of Ten Ongoing Practices*, ed. Miguel Mesa (Medellín: Agencia de Cooperacion e Inversion de Medellín y el Area Metropolitana, 2011), 54; Jota Samper, "Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence: Case Study of Medellín, Colombia," *Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence Project*, May 2012, http://s3.amazonaws. com/academia.edu.documents/30887962/Medellin_URCV.pdf?A.

[9] Bonnilla, "Strategy for the Territorialization of Security," 54.

[10] Uildriks, "Police Reform," 5–6.

Thus, this thesis aims to understand policy variations better within Latin American countries. Why did Rio de Janeiro and Medellín develop such different programs? What factors shaped such policy divergences among seemingly similar countries in the region? In other words, why do the Rio and Medellín models vary so much in scope and approach? The answers to these questions can help policymakers in the region better understand the host of factors that help shape policy in their own country and in other countries.

Finally, this thesis sheds some light on the ongoing discussion about how to improve public security conditions in Latin America. Given that so many police models have appeared in the region; comparing them might assist in identifying their level of effectiveness and efficiency.

C.   PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

This thesis tests and assesses two sets of hypotheses. First, this study examines how different patterns of democratization have shaped and affected public security programs in both Brazil and Colombia. Although both Latin American countries are currently considered democratic, they underwent different processes of democratization.

Brazil has experienced a different form of political development, in which the recent legacies of authoritarianism are perhaps more present than in Medellín. The author, therefore, hypothesizes that Brazil's policing approach was conceived during the dictatorship, and thus, contains remnants from that era.[11] In fact, Brazil's police force is made of two main groups, the military police (MP) and civil police (CP), with the UPPs being a contingent of the MP.[12] The MP is responsible for crime prevention and order while the CP is responsible for investigating crimes and criminal proceedings.[13] Each state's governor provides guidance to the MP through the state secretary for public

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[11] Mercedes S. Hinton, "A Distant Reality: Democratic Policing in Argentina and Brazil," *Criminal Justice* 5, no. 1 (2005): 82, 94–95.

[12] Hinton, "A Distant Reality," 86; Pacifying Police Unit, "About."

[13] Hinton, "A Distant Reality," 82–86.

security.[14] Even after the transition to democracy, the MP maintains a legacy of autonomy from civilian accountability, as its members are tried in military courts for anything less than murder and significant civilian oversight is lacking.[15] The lack of accountability to the public and the hierarchical structure of the MP partially explain why the UPP program was developed by the State Secretary for Public Security of Rio de Janeiro as a "top down" program instead of up from the city level.[16] Police autonomy encouraged the development of a security program that complemented the existing approach and structure of the police rather than one that includes significant restructuring.

By contrast, Colombia's longer history of democratic rule has left fewer traces of authoritarianism, which might have contributed to the development of a "bottom up" approach to public security. Different patterns of political development may explain why the Colombian government has given significant control to the country's mayors over the dispersal of funds and the local police force.[17] The police in Colombia have been organized into a national force under civilian control even though it falls under the Ministry of National Defense.[18] In Medellín, the police have a 20-year history of community policing, which contributes to a closer interaction with the local community.[19] These factors have contributed to the Medellín Model coming from Medellín's mayor and citizen organizations.[20]

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[14] Fiona Macaulay, "Problems of Police Oversight in Brazil" (CBS Working Paper 33-02, Centre for Brazilian Studies, University of Oxford, Oxford, 2002), 6–7, http://lac-live.nsms.ox.ac.uk/sites/sias/files/documents/Macaulay33.pdf.

[15] Hinton, "A Distant Reality," 89; Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, "Democratic Governance, Violence, and the (Un)Rule of Law," *Daedalus* 129, no. 2 (2000): 122, 127; Arthur Trindade Maranhao Costa, "Police Brutality in Brazil: Authoritarian Legacy or Institutional Weakness?," *Latin American Perspectives* 38, no. 19 (2011): 29–30.

[16] Carneiro, "The Politics of Pacification in Rio de Janeiro."

[17] Francisco Gutierrez et al., "The Importance of Political Coalitions in the Successful Reduction of Violence in Colombian Cities," *Urban Studies* 50, no. 15 (2013): 3137–3138.

[18] Juan Carlos Ruiz Vasquez, "Colombian Police Under Fire: Image, Corruption and Controls," *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management* 36, no. 2 (2013): 400.

[19] Samper, "Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence," 11–12.

[20] Gutierrez et al., "The Importance of Political Coalitions," 3139.

The second set of hypotheses to be explored in this thesis deal with the type of philosophy that drives both public security programs. For instance, the author argues that the philosophy of the UPP program focuses on achieving public security in each *favela* through a series of waves.[21] The first wave includes members of the Special Police Operations Battalion (BOPE) and the military coming into the *favela* in force to push out the drug traffickers and organized crime.[22] Once some level of physical security is achieved, the UPPs are established and followed by public services, social programs, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO).[23] The UPP program is a public security program that establishes physical security first, and then is followed by the implementation of social and welfare issues through UPP Social.[24] UPP Social coordinates the activities of the mayor's office, federal government, and NGOs to establish public utility services, promote economic integration, facilitate social benefits, and support community involvement.[25] In contrast, the philosophy of the Medellín Model focuses on addressing the social issues that contribute to criminal behavior and the absence of the state through public work projects.[26] The Medellín model addresses social issues and security simultaneously with formal community involvement, such as Young Force, Youth with Future, Local Governance Committees (LGC), and the Local Planning and Participative Budget Program.[27]

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[21] Robert Muggah and Albert Walter Souza Mulli, "Paving the Hills and Leveling the Streets: Counter-Insurgency in Rio de Janeiro," in *Stabilization Operations, Security and Development: States of Fragility, Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding*, edited by Robert Muggah (New York: Routledge, 2013), 202–206.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Carneiro, "The Politics of Pacification in Rio de Janeiro."

[25] Pacifying Police Unit Social, "About," accessed September 1, 2013, http://www.uppsocial.org/about/.

[26] Luisa Sotomayor, "Medellín: The New Celebrity?," Spatial Planning in Latin America, last modified August 26, 2013, http://planninglatinamerica.wordpress.com/2013/08/26/Medellín-the-new-celebrity.

[27] Gutierrez et al., "The Importance of Political Coalitions," 3143; Bonnilla, "Strategy for the Territorialization of Security," 57, 61; Agency of Cooperation and Investment, "Introduction," 27.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review draws on the contribution that Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan, Narcís Serra, Mark Ungar, and Claudio A. Fuentes make to the knowledge of police reform in Latin America. Linz and Stepan describe how the regime type and nature of transition to democracy impacts the following government.[28] Serra writes about the impact civilian-military relations have on democratic consolidation after the transition from a military regime.[29] Ungar provides a descriptive analysis of the interaction of politics, institutions, and society in the area of security reform.[30] Fuentes examines the opportunities and challenges for the civil rights coalition and pro-order coalition to influence policy outcomes using a new-institutionalism approach.[31]

1. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan

Linz and Stepan describe how the type of nondemocratic regime and the factors of the transition influence the consolidation of democracy.[32] In their analysis of nondemocratic regimes, they include authoritarian, totalitarian, post-totalitarian, and sultanistic, but for purposes of this thesis, the focus is on their views on authoritarian regimes.[33] Linz and Stepan further develop the idea that a hierarchical military that leads a nondemocratic regime and has integrated itself into the routine functions of the state are less motivated to remove itself from controlling the government.[34] If the opposition coalition is weak, then the military is able to set the terms to favor itself during the transition to democracy, which can include protection from the consequences of human

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[28] Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) 54–56.

[29] Narcís Serra, *The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces*, trans. Peter Bush (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1.

[30] Ungar, *Policing Democracy*, 18.

[31] Claudio A. Fuentes, *Contesting the Iron Fist: Advocacy Networks and Police Violence in Democratic Argentina and Chile* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 7, 46–47.

[32] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*, 38.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid., 67.

rights violations.[35] Linz and Stepan utilize Brazil as an example, and state that compared to other countries in the study that includes Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina, "Brazil has experienced the most difficulty in consolidating democracy."[36] In Brazil, the military took 16 years to transition control to civilian leadership, and according to Linz and Stepan's view, the transition was not complete until 1990.[37] Since the military initiated the transition and a strong opposition was not pushing them out, it was able to control the pace and the terms that allowed it to leave a lasting impact on the new government's constitution.[38] Thus, if a hierarchical military has been in charge for a long time, and is able to set the terms for its transition from power, then it will be able to leave a lasting influence on the institutions of the state.

2. Narcís Serra

Serra draws on his experience as Spain's minister of defense during the transition from a military regime to democratic rule to develop an understanding of how civilian-military relations impact democratic consolidation.[39] Serra adopts a normative approach to develop what steps a post-transition government can take to complete the transition to a consolidated democracy in which the government leads the military and not the other way around.[40] The military can undermine the institutionalization of democracy by maintaining autonomy from the government and limiting its ability to take charge of political decisions.[41] Serra believes that "consolidation occurs when the elected civilian government is able to establish military and defence policies, ensures they are implemented and directs the activities of the armed forces."[42] To facilitate consolidation, the civilian government will implement military reform that will transition the military

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[35] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*, 67–68.

[36] Ibid., 166.

[37] Ibid., 168.

[38] Ibid., 168–69.

[39] Serra, *The Military Transition*, 1.

[40] Ibid., 3, 16.

[41] Ibid., 16.

[42] Ibid., 28.

along a path toward greater civilian oversight and less military autonomy.[43] Key steps along that path include limiting the military's influence over civilian organizations like the police and remodeling the military justice system.[44] That former step is still outstanding in both Brazil and Colombia because the police fall under their respective ministers of defense and the latter step remains to be taken in Brazil because the MP has impunity from civilian courts since it is covered by the military justice system.[45]

3. Max Ungar

Ungar develops an intricate structure for investigating areas of reforms, realms of change, challenges to reform, and strategies to overcome challenges, which provides useful definitions of the different styles of policing and five focus areas when looking at police reform.[46] He groups the challenges to citizen security into "institutional relations, daily policing, and the spectrum of reform."[47] Using Honduras, Bolivia, and Argentina as cases, Ungar goes into a detailed analysis of the successes and failures of security reform in each country, but fails to delve into the underlying reasons for these results. Fuentes does not focus on the different facets of security reform that Ungar does, but provides analysis into the factors that influence the contest between civil rights and public security in policy development.[48]

Mark Ungar describes three different styles of policing, which include traditional policing, problem-oriented policing, and community policing.[49] These different styles are not exclusive from each other, but rather can be implemented at the same time to varying degrees.[50] Therefore, a policing program can have characteristics of traditional policing and problem-oriented policing, but the more aspects of one strategy used will cause less

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[43] Serra, *The Military Transition*, 44.

[44] Ibid., 74, 83.

[45] Hinton, "A Distant Reality," 89; Pinheiro, "Democratic Governance, Violence, and the (Un)Rule of Law," 122, 127; Maranhao Costa, "Police Brutality in Brazil," 29–30.

[46] Ungar, *Policing Democracy,* 325.

[47] Ibid., 11.

[48] Fuentes, *Contesting the Iron Fist*, 1.

[49] Ungar, *Policing Democracy,* 4–5.

[50] Ibid., 5–6.

of the other strategy to be used. Traditional policing is characterized by executive control, vertical hierarchy, professionalization, and quick response to criminal acts.[51] It focuses on reacting to criminal acts and establishing control while problem-oriented policing works to understand the factors that influence crime and then address those factors.[52] The process of problem-oriented policing is an analytical approach that involves the police categorizing different crimes and then focusing on crime groups instead of individual crimes.[53] Ungar provides an excellent contrast between these two styles when he writes, "Beyond aiming for particular goals or more efficiency, problem-oriented policing is about forging a new more flexible internal disposition geared toward processing problems beyond the traditional triad of patrol, detention, and investigation."[54]

Community policing is the most recently developed style of policing.[55] Like problem-oriented policing, community policing focuses on prevention versus control, but with community policing, the local citizens are incorporated into the approach to public security.[56] Citizens are included in the establishment of security through community watch groups, citizen-police councils, and community education programs.[57] As the program is implemented, police are reorganized to allow greater autonomy for the local officers to respond to the needs of the local community.[58] Community policing also incorporates other aspects of the state by "decentralizing social services to the local level and formally incorporating them into crime policy."[59] Although community policing can be seen as a final goal, Ungar suggests that the development of problem-oriented policing

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[51] Ibid., 4, 33.

[52] Ibid., 6.

[53] Ibid., 5.

[54] Ibid., 6.

[55] Ibid., 4.

[56] Ibid., 9.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid., 9–10.

[59] Ibid., 10.

procedures provides the means to transform traditional policing, as well as improve democracy and citizen security.[60]

Ungar's framework for the five areas of security reform includes: "(1) agency restructuring, (2) professional support, (3) control mechanisms, (4) legal changes, and (5) community policing."[61] Agency restructuring involves organizational change designed to make "the police more accountable, more professional, and more efficient."[62] It is focused on decentralizing control, increasing specialization around police functions, and simplifying hierarchy.[63] Professional support includes better training, technological support, and pay.[64] Control mechanism reforms increase public transparency of police operations, as well as police accountability to society.[65] These controls can come from the creation of agencies that provide oversight within or outside of the police.[66] Legal change can modify what is considered illegal and how the police respond to illegal acts.[67] These changes can influence the whole judicial system through shifting responsibility, authority, and judicial procedures.[68] Community policing reforms include changes in policing that increase the incorporation of citizens into the security process.[69]

4. Claudio A. Fuentes

Claudio A. Fuentes's framework focuses on the interaction between the civil rights coalition and the pro-order coalition as they try to influence policy outcome.[70] The civil rights coalition is made up of all politicians, lawyers, advocacy network, and human

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[60] Ibid., 324.

[61] Ibid., 5.

[62] Ibid., 7.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid., 8.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid., 8–9.

[68] Ibid., 8.

[69] Ibid., 9.

[70] Fuentes, *Contesting the Iron Fist*, 41.

rights groups that work to improve civil rights and protection for citizens.[71] The pro-order coalition is made up of all politicians, state bureaucrats, and police that try to maintain social order through ensuring limited restrictions are put on the police.[72] The ability of each coalition to influence policy comes from the political opportunity structure and the coalition's capacity for resource mobilization.[73] Fuentes defines the political opportunity structure by "the nature of the transition to democracy, access to the political system, and the structure of the police."[74] The transition to democracy leaves its impact on the nature of institutions and its ability to address human rights issues.[75] Political access affects the ability of the human rights group to influence political leaders and the pro-order group to resist change.[76] Police structure can make it more or less responsive to civilian influence, which can improve its ability to resist police reform.[77] The political opportunity structure is key to the analysis provided in this thesis.

E.   METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis provides a comparative study of the development of the Medellín Model and UPP program. Colombia and Brazil face similar challenges of crime, poverty, and drug traffickers, but have developed different approaches to addressing these issues. The focus is on how the political history, political structure and police structure of both Colombia and Brazil influenced their individual police reform. This research focuses primarily on secondary sources, which include published books, newspaper articles, and articles from academic journals. These sources also include documents that describe their political history and structure with special attention to their democratic transitions. Included as well are writings that detail the history of policing and how each police

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[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid., 41–42.

[73] Ibid., 46.

[74] Ibid., 6.

[75] Ibid., 34–35.

[76] Ibid., 35.

[77] Ibid., 36.

reform developed. Primary sources include facts and figures from international, governmental, and NGOs, such as the United Nations and World Bank.

F.   THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis addresses the public security reforms in Brazil and Colombia by analyzing them individually and then comparing them to each other. The chapter on Rio de Janeiro, Brazil explores Brazil's history of military rule and its lingering impact, Brazil's police structure and heritage, and the UPP program. The chapter on Medellín, Colombia examines Colombia's police structure and accountability, Colombia's history of military rule, and the different facets of the Medellín Model. Each public security reform is analyzed for the different programs that make it up and how the program came to be developed. The next chapter illustrates how the two programs are similar and how they are different. The final chapter summarizes the author's findings and provides concluding remarks.

II.   RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL

A.   INTRODUCTION

Brazil currently has the seventh-largest economy in the world, but struggles to ensure public security to the point where it is among the world's most dangerous countries.[78] The challenges to public security include income inequality, meeting social needs, and dealing with drug-trafficking networks.[79] From 1996 to 2006, Rio de Janeiro has reported an average homicide rate of 50 per 100,000, but the *favelas* have an even higher homicide rate.[80] Beginning in 2008, the government worked to address the challenges faced by those who live in the *favelas* through the implementation of the UPP program.[81] Its policing history and structure contributed to the development of a "top down" public security program instead of one that was developed from the city level or up from the community level. Brazil's security philosophy inclined the program to focus on the establishment of physical security first and then address social issues second.[82]

B.   MILITARY RULE

Brazil was under an authoritarian military regime from 1964 until 1985.[83] The military staged a coup in 1964 to overthrow the government of João Goulart, due to concerns over the country's economic instability and the growing influence of the political left.[84] During these 21 years, the military exerted influence over all aspects of the Brazilian government to include the structure of the political landscape and public

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[78] "GDP (current US$)," accessed September 20, 2013, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP. MKTP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2012+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc; Susana Gratius, "Brazil in the Americas: A Regional Peace Broker?," FRIDE Working Paper 35, Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior, Madrid, Spain, April 2007, 10–11, http://www.fride. org/descarga/WP35_BraAmer_ENG_abr07.pdf; Ungar, *Policing Democracy,* 2.

[79] Gratius, "Brazil in the Americas," 10–11.

[80] Arias, *Drugs and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro*, 1.

[81] Pacifying Police Unit, "About"; "History."

[82] Carneiro, "The Politics of Pacification in Rio de Janeiro," 2.

[83] Thomas E. Skidmore, Peter H. Smith, and James N. Green, *Modern Latin America*, 7th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 337.

[84] Ibid., 335.

security.[85] Brazil's transition back from military rule to democratic rule did not take place through a rapid collapse of the authoritarian government, but through a slow process of the military releasing control and allowing political processes to operate democratically. Part of the reason that the military accepted this reduction in power is that the military saw the coup as a temporary necessity because of its "self-perception as arbiters and guarantors of political order."[86] During this slow transition, the military tried to organize the structure of political parties and election process to favor itself, but when they realized that the public would vote against the military backed party, they allowed the democratization process to continue.[87] Since the military controlled the pace of the transition to democracy, it was able to control the terms of the process and ensured that government personnel involved in torture and crimes against humanity were granted amnesty.[88] Instead of having the institutional structure created by the government torn down and reformed following the military being removed from power, the military was able to influence the transition, which allowed its influence on institutions and democratic institution building to remain. One of the main institutions that maintained the imprint of the military's influence was the Brazilian police.

C.   BRAZIL'S POLICE

The structure of Brazil's political and judicial system influences the organization of its police.[89] Brazil's police force is made of two main groups, the (MP and CP, with the UPP being a contingent of the MP.[90] The MP is responsible for crime prevention and ensuring order while the CP is responsible for investigating crimes and criminal proceedings.[91] Between the MP and CP, the MP is significantly larger because it contains

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[85] Hinton, "A Distant Reality," 81.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Skidmore, Smith, and Green, *Modern Latin America,* 340–41.

[88] Ibid., 341.

[89] Macaulay, "Problems of Police Oversight in Brazil," 6.

[90] Hinton, "A Distant Reality," 86; Pacifying Police Unit, "About."

[91] Hinton, "A Distant Reality," 86.

"78 per cent of all state police personnel."[92] The country's penal codes are developed at the federal level, but the police agencies are directed and funded at the state level of government.[93] The split between the federal and state authority creates a gap that limits the ability of the state government to shape the police structure because they do not institute the penal codes.[94] There have been "proposals for the institutional integration of the police… brought before Congress but have thus far failed to advance."[95] The reason for this failure is the "weakness of the institutional mechanisms for controlling police activity."[96] During Brazil's dictatorship, the police were under the guidance of the military, but authority was eventually transferred to the State Secretary for Public Security during the transition to democracy.[97] This authority is not extensive though because the police maintain significant "budgetary and functional autonomy."[98] Organizational autonomy allows the police to hold influence over what reforms are adopted and how significant of a change is created. This autonomy allows the police to resist outside influence and oversight from government officials.

1.   Military Heritage

Brazil's policing approach was originally conceived during the dictatorship and contains remnants from that era even though it has evolved to some extent.[99] During the transition to democracy, the police force was given protection from prosecution for rights violations committed during the authoritarian regime, which allowed the existing leadership to remain in place.[100] Maintaining the leaders who were in command during the military regime allows the culture developed during that time to persist. The police accountability that does exist is provided by "four distinct police oversight mechanisms,

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[92] Macaulay, "Problems of Police Oversight in Brazil," 9.

[93] Ibid., 6.

[94] Pinheiro, "Democratic Governance, Violence, and the (Un)Rule of Law," 127.

[95] Maranhao Costa, "Police Brutality in Brazil," 27.

[96] Ibid., 31.

[97] Macaulay, "Problems of Police Oversight in Brazil," 6–7.

[98] Maranhao Costa, "Police Brutality in Brazil," 28.

[99] Hinton, "A Distant Reality," 82, 94–95.

[100] Macaulay, "Problems of Police Oversight in Brazil," 6.

located in three separate branches of government… the judiciary (military courts), the executive (internal affairs department and the ombudsman's office attached to the police department), and the *Ministério Público* (prosecution service) a peculiarly Brazilian institution that is functionally separate from both judiciary and executive and often termed a 'forth power.'"[101] Although the structures for police accountability exist, little accountability is in practice.

The MP maintains a legacy of autonomy from civilian accountability because its members are tried in military courts for anything less than intentional homicide.[102] The military courts inherently lack civilian oversight because military personnel are in charge of all aspects of criminal investigation and prosecution.[103] Control over the investigation phase is key because the military personnel are responsible for determining whether a homicide was intentional or if it was in the line of duty.[104] A military heritage of valuing good order and discipline also remains, which results in harsh punishment for minor infractions and deference for the organizational hierarchy.[105] The insulation provided by the military court systems allows major infractions like torture to be addressed within the police structure, which may result in the offenders losing their job, but will not likely lead to criminal charges.[106] Fiona Macaulay writes, "As a result many violent policemen end up as private security guards, or even rejoin the force in another state."[107] The military court system is one of the biggest contributors to police autonomy and impunity. The autonomy afforded by military courts that applies to the MP applies to the UPP as well because the UPP are a branch of the MP.

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[101] Ibid., 7.

[102] Hinton, "A Distant Reality," 89; Pinheiro, Democratic Governance, Violence, and the (Un)Rule of Law," 122, 127; Maranhao Costa, "Police Brutality in Brazil," 29–30.

[103] Macaulay, "Problems of Police Oversight in Brazil," 9.

[104] Ibid., 9, 12.

[105] Ibid., 9.

[106] Ibid., 10.

[107] Ibid.

2.   Police Accountability

The internal affairs department is responsible for investigating accusations against police officers, but since they are also police officers, they can be pressured by the police chief to protect the reputation of the organization.[108] A large number of complaints are misplaced, downplayed, or dismissed outright as a result of this peer influence.[109] Even if the internal affairs department had the autonomy to conduct unbiased investigations, it tends to be poorly funded and under staffed.[110] Those assigned to internal affairs also face the challenge of returning to the regular police force and possibly working with the friends of people they may have investigated and possibly charged with violations.[111] In the 1990s, the ombudsman's office was created to try to add some independence to internal oversight, but it has not been significantly successful.[112] Although civilians staff it, the ombudsman's office lacks sufficient authority to ensure police accountability due to being unable to conduct investigations or prosecute offenders.[113] Even though it can do little on its own, the ombudsman's office's most significant impact comes from bringing information about accusations to the public's attention and passing the information to the Ministério Público.[114]

The Ministério Público was given substantial power in the 1988 Constitution and is an important source of accountability.[115] It is not only responsible for providing oversight for the police, but "is also tasked with defending the legal order, ensuring that the authorities respect the rights guaranteed under the Constitution, and protecting the democratic regime, public patrimony, and 'diffuse and collective rights.'"[116] Although it has made significant strides in confronting political corruption, the Ministério Público has

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[108] Macaulay, "Problems of Police Oversight in Brazil," 11.

[109] Ibid., 11, 13.

[110] Ibid., 13.

[111] Ibid.

[112] Ibid., 14.

[113] Ibid., 14, 16.

[114] Ibid., 17.

[115] Ibid., 18.

[116] Ibid.

not challenged problems within the police.[117] Part of the reason lies in the structure of Brazil's judicial process. Brazil has a two-phase judicial process with the first phase being an investigation, which is usually conducted by the police, and a prosecution phase, which involves the judicial staff and the point at which the Ministério Público can become involved.[118] If the Ministério Público inserts itself into the first phase, it meets significant and sometimes active resistance from the police.[119] Situations have occurred in which the police have barred personnel of the Ministério Público from gaining access to police stations during their investigations.[120] Another reason is that the Ministério Público has a broadly defined mission and is not required to focus solely on police misconduct, but it does have the capability to provide needed accountability.[121] The weakness of Brazil's oversight institutions contributes to the police being unresponsive to calls for change from the community and only moderately responsive to reforms coming from the state government.

3.   Police and Military Joint Operations

Tied to the lack of accountability for the police is the tendency to use the military to stabilize neighborhoods and an absence of community policing activity.[122] The military was brought into the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro in 1992 to prevent disturbances during the United Nations Earth Summit.[123] In 1994 during Operation Rio, the military was used to provide the force necessary to suppress drug traffickers.[124] Troops were called again into Rio de Janeiro's *favelas* in 2002 to ensure smooth elections, and in 2004, to quell a gang war.[125] Saima Husain provides an excellent description of Brazil's

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[117] Macaulay, "Problems of Police Oversight in Brazil," 18.

[118] Ibid., 20.

[119] Ibid., 21.

[120] Ibid., 21–22.

[121] Ibid., 22.

[122] Fiona Macaulay, "Deepening the Federative Pact?: The Dilma Government's Approach to Crime, Justice and Policing," *Critical Sociology* 38, no. 6 (2012): 831.

[123] Ibid.

[124] Ibid.

[125] Ibid.

heritage when she writes, "Efforts to police Rio's *favelas* have historically involved the traditional militarized model of policing. This typically consists of entering *favelas* heavily armed and in force, using brutal repressive tactics against its residents, and engaging in shoot-outs with suspected drug traffickers that often leave many civilians dead or injured."[126] The heavy use of the military stands counter to the effort to implement community policing practices in Brazil, but coordinated operations between the police and military is a key aspect of the UPP program.

4.   Community Policing

Community policing was first implemented in 1983, but because of disordered implementation, and a lack of commitment when political administrations changed, it was cancelled in 1987.[127] The strategy was attempted again in 1991 in Grajaú and Copacabana in 1994, but without lasting results.[128] The application of community policing tends to be in limited parts of the state and relies on volunteers from the police force to be assigned to these specific programs.[129] The extent of the programs is so limited that one police battalion may have community policing in one area and then traditional policing in another.[130] Brazil's reliance on a traditional policing strategy and failure to develop a significant community policing program has contributed to a lack of mechanism for the police to receive input from or be influenced by the community. This lack of accountability to the local populace has contributed to the police only being trusted by approximately 25 percent of the population, but the development of the UPP program does mark a change.[131]

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[126] Saima Husain, "On the Long Road to Demilitarization and Professionalization of the Police in Brazil," in *Policing Insecurity: Police Reform, Security, and Human Rights in Latin America*, ed. Niels Uildriks (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), 55.

[127] Maranhao Costa, "Police Brutality in Brazil," 27.

[128] Ibid., 29.

[129] Husain, "On the Long Road to Demilitarization and Professionalization of the Police in Brazil," 62.

[130] Ibid.

[131] Vasquez, "Colombian Police Under Fire," 404.

D. PACIFYING POLICE UNITS

The police in Brazil face significant challenges toward increasing its accountability to the public and adopting community policing, but the UPP program does have the benefit of being an innovative policing organization made up of brand new policemen.[132] Bringing in new policemen provides the possibility of having a different culture and mindset in the UPP than is seen in the rest of the MP. Each UPP has its own separate headquarters from the rest of the MP and its own police bases as well.[133] Although the UPPs are administratively connected to a MP Battalion, this process works to decentralize the control of the UPP to the headquarters that reside in the communities being pacified.[134] The police of the UPP actively incorporate the principles of community policing and work to establish dialogue with the residents to address the unique issues that exist in each *favela*.[135] Once physical security has been established, public services are brought into the neighborhood to help incorporate the *favela* into the infrastructure and institutions of the surrounding city.[136] The UPP program includes a branch of City Hall devoted to addressing these social issues known as UPP Social.[137] UPP Social helps to facilitate the provision of services to the *favelas* and organizes community involvement.[138] This process addresses the social concerns of the community while the UPP focuses on physical security. Involved in implementing the UPP program is agency restructuring, professional support, control mechanisms, and the development of community policing. These changes are positive, but they are limited by the institutional inertia of the police and its ability to limit attempts at reform from the outside of the organization.

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[132] "UPP," accessed September 1, 2013 http://www.upprj.com/upload/multimidia/LIVRO_UPPs_INGLES.pdf.

[133] Ibid.

[134] Ibid.

[135] Ibid.

[136] Ibid.

[137] Pacifying Police Unit Social, "About."

[138] Ibid.

As the program was developed, it worked to stay within the judicial and police framework that existed instead of trying to develop a program that required significant federal and state reform.[139] This requirement was created by the autonomy of the police and how previous attempts at significant reform had failed. It worked to mold together a program that incorporated the crime control of traditional policing with the principles of community policing.[140] The philosophy of the program is shown in its four basic goals:

> (1) police coercion was to be used against the armed criminal gangs that had taken control of certain "territories" (2) police activity was to be raised to a level where it was no longer worth engaging in criminal activities (3) the police were to be granted a permanent presence in pacified communities (4) support was to be given by the police for policies of social inclusion being introduced by other agencies.[141]

These goals were inspired by military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as Brazil's own experience during peacekeeping operations in Haiti.[142] The continued influence of a military mindset is shown in the use of the military to occupy *favelas* like Complexo do Alemão in 2010 and 2012.[143] The security issues of the *favelas* were influenced by a military perspective, which contributed to the program's focus on physical security.

The program was also influenced by the views of Rio de Janeiro Governor Sérgio Cabral, whose "security policy was described as a 'policy of confrontation' in the press and was described by Amnesty International as 'draconian and aggressive.'"[144] The physical security provided by pacification is seen as raising the cost of crime to change the focus of youth from short-term gains like criminal activity to long-term gains like education.[145] The philosophy was shaped to meet the challenges faced in the Brazilian political system, which relies heavily on coalitions to the point that a minority can disrupt

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[139] Carneiro, "The Politics of Pacification in Rio de Janeiro," 4.

[140] Ibid., 7.

[141] Ibid., 8.

[142] Ibid.

[143] Ibid.

[144] Ibid., 10.

[145] Ibid., 11.

the process.[146] The program needed its philosophy to be aligned with the influential MP lobby.[147] One way that the MP lobby was appeased was that those participating in the UPPs would receive extra pay.[148] They also shaped the philosophy to appeal to the politicians who believed the public wanted a heavy-handed response to crime.[149] Due to these influences, the UPP program is a public security program that establishes physical security first, and then is followed by addressing social issues rather than addressing them simultaneously.[150]

It is the responsibility of UPP Social to address social issues in the *favelas*, but it seems to be more of an afterthought because UPP Social was not developed until two years after the UPP program was introduced.[151] When UPP Social begins to work in a *favela*, it sets up meetings with local leaders, neighborhood associations, and the public in general over several weeks.[152] UPP Social then brings in a team to perform a socioeconomic analysis of the *favela* to identify the major issues of the community and to establish a baseline.[153] After the information is gathered, an open forum is held with the community, UPP leaders, and municipal representatives to highlight concerns and discuss possible plans.[154] Once the this initial stage is complete, two to three UPP Social officials remain attached to the *favela* to coordinate the efforts of government agencies and monitor the progress of the plan.[155] Although UPP Social does ask for input from the community, some residents in the Vidigal *favela* are concerned that UPP Social's plans

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[146] Carneiro, "The Politics of Pacification in Rio de Janeiro," 13.

[147] Ibid., 11.

[148] Ibid., 15.

[149] Ibid., 14.

[150] Ibid., 2.

[151] "Bringing the State Back into the *Favelas* of Rio de Janeiro: Understanding Changes in Community Life after the UPP Pacification Process," October 2012, 38, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/ external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/03/15/000333037_20130315115010/Rendered/PDF/ 760110ESW0P12300Rio0de0Janeiro02013.pdf.

[152] Ibid.

[153] Ibid.

[154] Ibid.

[155] Ibid.

tend to focus on formalizing utility services and stopping utility theft instead of the community's priorities of better schools, healthcare, and police accountability.[156]

E. TRENDS

The implementation of the UPP program has come with both positive and negative results. One of the positives is the drop in homicides seen in pacified communities. Between 2006 and 2011, *favelas* with UPP units have seen a 78 percent drop in the number of homicides.[157] In Rio de Janeiro, the homicide rate went from 37.8 per 100,000 in 2007 to 20.5 per 100,000 in 2013, which was in part due to the introduction of UPPs.[158] Robberies have decreased by 15 percent with the implementation of UPPs.[159] Despite the drop in homicides and robberies, crimes, such as threats, domestic violence, and rape have increased in pacified *favelas*, which could be in part to the removal of the informal rules violently enforced by local drug lords.[160] Between the presence of gangs and drug lords, residents tend to prefer the presence of the UPP even though it is not a perfect solution.[161] Amnesty International recognizes that there were only "20 deaths as a result of police interventions in UPP areas in 2014, which is 85% lower than the number recorded in 2008 (136 fatalities)."[162] Even with this drop in police related fatalities, UPP officers are still caught in episodes of corruption and

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[156] Carolyn Prouse, "Framing the World cUPP: Competing Discourses of Favela Pacification as a Mega-Event Legacy in Brazil," *Recreation and Society in Africa, Asia, and Latin America* 3, no. 2 (2012): 14–15, https://journal.lib.uoguelph.ca/index.php/rasaala/article/view/2219/2715.

[157] "Bringing the State Back into the *Favelas* of Rio de Janeiro: Understanding Changes in Community Life after the UPP Pacification Process," 39.

[158] Simon Romero and Taylor Barnes, "Rio Grapples with Violence against Police Officers as World Cup Nears," *New York Times*, May 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/.

[159] "Bringing the State Back into the *Favelas* of Rio de Janeiro: Understanding Changes in Community Life after the UPP Pacification Process," 39.

[160] Ibid.

[161] Ioan Grillo, "Brazil's Police Struggle to Pacify Gang-Run Slums," *Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel* 7, no. 8 (2014): 16, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/brazils-police-struggle-to-pacify-gang-run-slums.

[162] Amnesty International, *You Killed My Son: Homicides by Military Police in the City of Rio de Janeiro* (London: Amnesty International, 2015), 28.

suspected in incidents of extrajudicial executions.[163] Residents of pacified areas are also facing the challenges of gentrification because the *favelas* that have been the first to receive UPPs tend to be in areas adjacent to affluent neighborhoods or tourist areas.[164] Those who live in un-pacified *favelas* are worried that they will need to wait a long time to get a UPP unit because only 38 UPP units are established to cover 196 communities and 600,000 people, but the *favelas* number approximately 599 and it costs approximately US$ 567,000 per year to run a single unit.[165] In Rio de Janeiro, concern is also raised as to whether the program will continue after the 2016 Olympics or if the UPP program was primarily a short-term solution to bring the Olympics to Brazil.[166]

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[163] Amnesty International, *You Killed My Son: Homicides by Military Police in the City of Rio de Janeiro*, 28; Felipe Araujo, "UPP Controls Follow Corruption Scandal," *The Rio Times*, July 10, 2012, http://www.riotimesonline.com/.

[164] Prouse, "Framing the World cUPP: Competing Discourses of Favela Pacification as a Mega-Event Legacy in Brazil," 15–16.

[165] Amnesty International, *You Killed My Son: Homicides by Military Police in the City of Rio de Janeiro*, 28, 33; Michael Miller, "The Economic, Social and Cultural Root Causes of Torture and Other Forms of Violence in Brazil." World Organisation against Torture, last modified January 10, 2010, 11, http://www.omct.org/files/2010/10/20936/brazil_follow_up_report_final_01_10_10.pdf.

[166] Victoria Baena, "Favelas in the Spotlight: Transforming the Slums of Rio de Janeiro," *Harvard International Review* (Spring 2011): 37.

III. MEDELLÍN, COLOMBIA

A. INTRODUCTION

The Medellín Model has been managed by the city's mayor and has been successfully maintained through three new administrations. It was founded during the administration of Sergio Fajardo, who served from 2004–2007. Alonso Salazar served as mayor from 2008–2011, and the current mayor is Anibal Gaviria. The Colombian Constitution was enacted in 1991, which gave increased political autonomy to mayors that helped provide the capacity for the mayors of Medellín to develop a new approach to addressing insecurity in their city.[167] The Medellín Model is framed by public intervention in the areas of education, social urbanism, social inclusion, civic culture, security, and entrepreneurial culture.[168] These areas are addressed through projects that often tackle multiple areas at once.[169] The process for developing projects for the Medellín Model includes four steps, which begins with planning and monitoring through the use of calculated measurements.[170] Two of these measurements used to analyze neighborhoods are the Human Development Index (HDI) and Quality of Life Survey Index (QLSI) because the focus is on substantive results to improve its programs continually.[171] The second step is to ensure that the program is funded cost effectively and public resources are allocated in a transparent manner because public trust and local participation are cornerstones of the Medellín Model.[172] One significant source of money is the city owned Municipal Utilities Company, which provides the city government with a source of revenue independent of taxes and the state.[173] The third step merges political

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[167] Francisco Gutierrez et al., "The Importance of Political Coalitions," *Urban Studies* 50, no. 15 (2013): 3137; Daniel Tubb, "Narratives of citizenship in Medellín, Colombia," *Citizenship Studies* 17, no. 5 (2013): 634.

[168] Agency of Cooperation and Investment of Medellín and the Metropolitan Area-ACI, "Introduction: Medellín: A Model of Integral Social Development and a Laboratory City," 22.

[169] Ibid., 23.

[170] Ibid., 23, 25.

[171] Ibid., 25.

[172] Ibid., 23.

[173] Luisa Sotomayor, "Medellín: The New Celebrity"

goals with the guidance and participation of local leaders.[174] The final step closes the feedback loop through the monitoring of the program and ensuring that the collected information drives the planning process, which ensures that the model will continue to innovate to address issues that persist and stay flexible to tackle new challenges.

B.   NEW PERSPECTIVE

The Medellín Model originates out of "the idea of guaranteeing citizen security and coexistence through integration, convergence and social articulation among the Municipal administration, law enforcement and justice, private enterprise and organized civil society."[175] This perspective stands in contrast to the previous view that the local government did not have a part to play in addressing the problems of violence and social insecurity locally because the source of conflict was tied to illegal groups that operated throughout the country.[176] That old view contributed to the local government withdrawing from the local community, which made it easier for guerrilla groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the United Self-Defense Forces (AUC) to gain influence throughout the city.[177] The first major step to reintegrate local government into previously marginalized areas of the city came in 2002 through action from the national level during Operation Orion, which came before the Medellín Model was developed.[178] Operation Orion was a military and police operation that pushed guerilla groups out of *Comuna* 13 in Medellín and started the demobilization of local paramilitary groups.[179] Although the national government helped with this first step, it was the local government that developed the Medellín Model and capitalized on the opportunity.

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[174] Agency of Cooperation and Investment, "Introduction: Medellín," 23.

[175] Bonnilla and Palma, "Strategy for the Territorialization of Security. Making Medellín Safer: Together We Can," 56.

[176] Ibid., 54.

[177] Ibid.

[178] Ibid., 55.

[179] Ibid.

C.   COLOMBIA'S POLICE

The Colombian police are instrumental actors in the Medellín Model and are primarily responsible for confronting violence and improving physical security in the neighborhoods of Medellín. Ever since the 1960s, the police force of Colombia has operated as a national organization, which has allowed it some autonomy from the influence of the military and political parties.[180] It has remained firmly as a civilian organization even though it technically falls under the Ministry of Defense.[181] This separation of the police from the military has fostered Medellín's police structure that has facilitated its transition toward community policing.

The Colombian police maintain a high level of respect among the population even though it continues to be plagued by instances of corruption.[182] Since the 1990s, the public's trust in the police has improved from 21 percent to 48 percent, which is high in comparison with other South American countries.[183] Part of the reason that the police ranked so low during the 1990s was due to several instances of police killing or forcibly removing homeless people from commercial districts at the request of local businessmen.[184] Colombia's inspector general has worked to address these challenges and hold police accountable. The inspector general office found that from 2001–2004, "the police have been punished 339 times, 216 for human rights violations."[185] Although autonomy in the police has presented a challenge to reform, the government was able to coordinate large-scale dismissals of problem police officers throughout the chain of command and institute some reforms in 1993 and 2003.[186] The hierarchical structure of police and division between police ranks has limited institutional corruption even though corruption exists.[187]

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[180] Vasquez, "Colombian Police Under Fire," 400.

[181] Ibid.

[182] Ibid.

[183] Ibid., 405.

[184] Ibid., 408.

[185] Ibid.

[186] Ibid., 410.

[187] Ibid., 411.

The inspector general of the police is an internal organization that primarily deals with enforcing internal rule violations rather than pursuing corruption and misconduct.[188] Other oversight committees have also been created, but with limited success. One example was a Police Commissioner office that was created and then closed three years later because it failed to accomplish any of its goals.[189] Although oversight is a challenge, it is estimated "that the head of the police in 1995 dismissed between 3 and 12 percent (12,000 policemen) of the whole force."[190] This percentage illustrates that problem officers are being removed from the force through internal means even though legal accountability for these problem officers may be limited. The attorney general and inspector general of Colombia are examples of two organizations external to the police that provide oversight.[191] They struggle with the large scale of their area of responsibility because it includes all public officials and not just the police.[192] The inspector general prosecuted 120 police officers during the course of 250 investigations between 1998 and 2003.[193]

D.   MILITARY RULE

One factor that has influenced the development of Colombia's political landscape has been the interaction of the military with the government. The Colombian military has only overthrown the government a few times in its history with the most recent time being when General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla removed President Laureano Gómez from power in 1953.[194] It was the first time the military had taken over since the coup by General José María Melo in 1854, which means Colombia had nearly 100 years of civilian rule before 1953.[195] Compared to other countries in South America, Colombia

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[188] Vasquez, "Colombian Police Under Fire," 412.

[189] Ibid.

[190] Ibid., 413.

[191] Ibid.

[192] Ibid., 414.

[193] Ibid.

[194] Skidmore, Smith, and Green, *Modern Latin America*, 208.

[195] Ibid., 195.

has not experienced a lot of interference from the military. The number of times the military has taken over is few, and when it has come into power, its rule has not lasted long. General Rojas' rule was approximately 60 years ago and it only lasted until 1957 when the government peacefully transitioned back to civilian control.[196] The military's time in power was not marked by significant institutional change or political oppression.[197] The nature of Colombia's transition to democracy has ensured that the military has left little remaining legacy on the institutions of Colombia. It has contributed to the political opportunity structure that allowed the Medellín Model to develop and for it to be a product of civilian organizations.

The National Front replaced General Rojas, which was a formal agreement between the Conservative and Liberal parties that ensured each side would share power throughout the different bodies of the government and that control of the presidency would alternate between the two parties.[198] This agreement reduced the conflict between the two largest parties, but marginalized and frustrated those who belonged to an omitted party, such as the Communist Party.[199] This exclusion eventually led to armed revolt and the development of revolutionary groups like the National Liberation Army (ELN) in 1962 and the FARC in 1966.[200] As a reaction to the violence spread by the ELN and FARC, paramilitary groups formed to protect economic and political interests.[201] These armed forces have had a major impact on the level of violence and insecurity in Medellín and throughout the country.

E.   MEDELLÍN MODEL

The Medellín Model is made up of a network of programs that work together to address the needs of the local community in order to reduce violence and crime. The

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[196] Skidmore, Smith, and Green, *Modern Latin America*, 208.

[197] Ibid.

[198] Ibid., 209.

[199] Ibid.

[200] Ibid., 209–10.

[201] Ibid., 214.

main needs addressed are education, economic opportunity, safe public spaces, and giving a voice to the marginalized.

1. Peace and Reconciliation Program

Paramilitary groups in particular were major local players in Medellín and contributed to the city's level of conflict. In 2004, Colombia's government began executing its demobilization agreement with the AUC, which was the country's largest paramilitary group with 31,137 personnel.[202] The Medellín Model took the legal framework established by the national government and then established a process locally to reintegrate the militants back into society both socially and economically.[203] Social reintegration was primarily accomplished through the healthcare system, which included access to psychosocial assistance for the demobilized.[204] Economic reintegration was executed through the Peace and Reconciliation Program that was developed within the Medellín Model, which focuses on education and training.[205] Individuals in the demobilization program have their skills and interests taken into account for a personalized education plan and are given access to whatever level of education they need.[206] The Medellín Model also incorporates guidance and resources from the national level and includes international partners, such as "the International Organization for Migration and the Embassy of the Netherlands."[207] It integrates these combined resources and efforts to provide demobilized combatants with the opportunity to reintegrate into society and pursue legitimate sources of income. It makes it less likely that their only way to earn money is through illegal means, which would draw them into one of the local gangs or drug trafficking organizations.

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[202] Myriam Merchan Bonnilla and Oscar Arcos Palma, "Peace and Reconciliation: Back to Legality," in *Medellín Laboratory: An Exhibit of Ten Ongoing Practices*, ed. Miguel Mesa (Medellín: Agencia de Cooperacion e Inversion de Medellín y el Area Metropolitana, 2011), 33.

[203] Ibid., 33, 35.

[204] Ibid., 36.

[205] Ibid.

[206] Ibid., 37.

[207] Ibid.

a.   Education

One of the main institutions used for the education of the demobilized is the Training Center for Peace and Reconciliation (CEPAR). It provides instruction from elementary school level through high school, as well as access to technical training.[208] CEPAR uses a comprehensive program that helps to expedite completion of high school so the demobilized combatants can quickly transition to further training or enter the job market.[209] Participants in the program are not limited to CEPAR itself, but can enroll at any school in Medellín.[210] Thus, they still receive personalized guidance and progress monitoring through the program, but are able to go to school in their home neighborhood.[211]

To encourage the successful completion of school, CEPAR reaches out to the student's family and provides daycare for the children of those in the program.[212] This assistance allows the participants to focus on academics and helps to lower obstacles to them turning their lives around. Those who desire to move onto higher education are given access to grants from public and private institutions, which include the mayor's office of Medellín and the Edupaz Fund.[213] The Peace and Reconciliation Program works as one strand in the web of institutions that make up the Medellín Model.

b.   Economic Opportunity

Participants in the program are networked with the Bank of Opportunities and the Zonal Business Development Centers (CEDEZO) to provide them access to loans that can be used to start an entrepreneurial business.[214] Between the years 2004 and 2010, over 5,500 demobilized combatants participated in the Peace and Reconciliation

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[208] Bonnilla and Palma, "Peace and Reconciliation: Back to Legality," 37.

[209] Ibid., 39.

[210] Ibid.

[211] Ibid.

[212] Ibid., 37.

[213] Ibid.

[214] Ibid., 42.

Program.[215] Almost half of those who participated took advantage of the educational opportunities provided by the program.[216] Approximately 500 participants found employment through the Peace and Reconciliation Program. In 2010, 129 former paramilitary members had completely readjusted to society and were ready to be released from the program.[217] The program's multifaceted approach has received positive recognition from the national and international community. The Peace and Reconciliation Program "was recognized as one of the best practices by the Dubai Awards."[218] It was also recognized by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations for its utilization of psycho-social activities for the demobilized and their families to help them to reintegrate into society.[219] The Colombian government has taken it as a model to be implemented throughout the country, which means the processes developed and improved in Medellín could influence the demobilization program implemented if peace is finally reached between the Colombian government and the FARC.[220]

2.   Youth Programs

To show that former paramilitary members are not the only ones given access to assistance, the Medellín Model includes three programs that provide training and job assistance to youth in impoverished areas, which are Young Force, Youth With Future, and Young Apprentices.[221] A wide range of opportunities is provided through the Medellín Model's different youth programs and CEDEZO.[222] The city's youth are a key focus because they represent nearly a quarter of the population, but 59 percent live below

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[215] Bonnilla and Palma, "Peace and Reconciliation: Back to Legality," 42.

[216] Ibid., 45.

[217] Ibid., 43.

[218] Ibid., 48.

[219] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations* (New York: United Nations, 2010), 52.

[220] Bonnilla and Palma, "Peace and Reconciliation: Back to Legality," 48.

[221] Ibid., 38.

[222] Bonnilla and Palma, "Strategy for the Territorialization of Security. Making Medellín Safer: Together We Can," 57.

the poverty line.[223] Previous administrations have failed to acknowledge how vulnerable youth are and failed to develop programs that addressed their needs.[224]

Young Force provides training and qualification in conflict resolution to people in the 14 to 29 age group who live in high crime areas of the city.[225] It also reaches out to young adults released from prison to facilitate their transition back into society, so they have opportunities other than criminal activities.[226] Young Force has been able to reach out and provide training to over 20,000 men and women since its creation.[227] It has also provided 2,000 ex-convicts and parolees services to reenter society and pursue education or work opportunities.[228] Young Force was recognized by the Inter-American Development Bank as the best program in a contest held for Good Practices in Crime Prevention.[229] Youth with Future focuses on those from impoverished backgrounds who are in the 16 to 29 age group and have dropped out from school.[230] The program provides them education opportunities to continue toward higher education or receive technical training to improve their employment prospects.[231] Young Apprentices works through the National Learning Service (SENA) to provide students with internship opportunities at a wide range of businesses and NGOs.[232]

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[223] Ibid., 55.

[224] Ibid.

[225] Bonnilla and Palma, "Peace and Reconciliation: Back to Legality," 40.

[226] Ibid.

[227] Bonnilla and Palma, "Strategy for the Territorialization of Security. Making Medellín Safer: Together We Can," 64.

[228] Ibid.

[229] Ibid., 65.

[230] Bonnilla and Palma, "Peace and Reconciliation: Back to Legality," 50.

[231] Ibid.

[232] Ibid.

3. Economic Opportunity

CEDEZO were created to provide the city's marginalized population access to loans, financial services, and entrepreneurial programs.[233] They also work to connect products produced by small businesses in Medellín to national and international markets.[234] CEDEZO work to develop business networks within the city for them to coordinate efforts and receive guidance from business and academic leaders.[235] Before a CEDEZO builds these business networks, it analyzes the economic landscape of each *comuna* where a CEDEZO is established.[236] Currently, 11 CEDEZO are located in the poorest neighborhoods of Medellín.[237] CEDEZO move beyond just providing access to loans, but rather help entrepreneurs overcome obstacles to success through creating networks and providing training and guidance by experts.[238] Poverty is seen as one of the key contributors to insecurity in Medellín, which is why much of the Medellín Model focuses on providing economic and educational opportunities.

4. Local Governance Committees

The Medellín Model identifies and weighs security issues in each *comuna* rather than creating a single style of program applied the same everywhere.[239] The citizens of each *comuna* are encouraged to participate in the process of addressing the local issues.[240] Civic culture is enhanced through "the creation of citizen networks, security fronts, security schools and area security committees."[241] The Medellín Model rejects traditional policing relationship between police and citizens to ensure that crime

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[233] Myriam Merchan Bonnilla and Oscar Arcos Palma, "Centers of Zonal Business Development: CEDEZO," in *Medellín Laboratory: An Exhibit of Ten Ongoing Practices*, ed. Miguel Mesa (Medellín: Agencia de Cooperacion e Inversion de Medellín y el Area Metropolitana, 2011), 132.

[234] Ibid.

[235] Ibid., 132–3.

[236] Ibid., 133.

[237] Ibid., 134.

[238] Ibid., 141.

[239] Bonnilla and Palma, "Strategy for the Territorialization of Security. Making Medellín Safer: Together We Can," 57.

[240] Ibid.

[241] Ibid.

deterrence and rehabilitation are active parts of the effort to promote community policing.[242] The mayor's office endorses the formation of LGC, which are key organizations in the Medellín Model:

> The LGC are administrative bodies in charge of coordinating and articulating the plans, programs and projects created by the municipal administration for public order, security and coexistence in each *comuna* and locality. These bodies consist of the police inspector, the family commissar, the commander of the police station, a social technician and the chairman of the local administration board. The purpose of these committees is to diagnose the security, coexistence and public order problems in each *comuna* and locality in order to lead and leverage specific actions aimed at solving them and giving legitimacy to the presence of the state in their territories.

> The LGC plays the role of an interlocutor between the central administration and the communities; it implements pedagogical strategies to encourage citizen participation, a culture of respect for life, legality, self-regulation, matters pertaining to the Government, and human rights; the committee prepares local security and coexistence plans; promotes the exercise of civil rights and social guarantees; help preserve public order and control any behaviors that go against it, implementing their actions according to applicable regulations; they convene, coordinate and provide constant accompaniment for the citizens coexistence councils and are leaders in the participative and pluralistic process to create the manual for community coexistence.[243]

LGC act as fusion centers where the different public and private organizations come together to reduce insecurity in Medellín. They provide a point of access to the political system for people who live in previously marginalized communities. LGC are even given their own capacity to address the concerns of the community directly because the participative budget process allows five percent of the allotted funds to be used at the discretion of the local leadership.[244]

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[242] Bonnilla and Palma, "Strategy for the Territorialization of Security. Making Medellín Safer: Together We Can," 58.

[243] Ibid., 61.

[244] Agency of Cooperation and Investment of Medellín and the Metropolitan Area-ACI, "Introduction: Medellín: A Model of Integral Social Development and a Laboratory City," 28.

5. Information Sharing

Focusing on the security needs of each individual neighborhood and identifying specific focal points localizes security.[245] A key feature of the process to identify needs and problem areas was the creation of the Information System for Security and Coexistence (SISC), which is a shared database system that allows separate neighborhoods and agencies to coordinate efforts and insight.[246] The SISC pools data on criminal activity with a focus on "the dynamics of the conflict, homicide and high-impact crime, the operation of the justice system and family violence."[247] The SISC receives information contributions from a variety of sources, which include the police, social workers, school administrators, health administrators, and local government officials.[248] The SISC improves the ability of program managers, the police, and the local community to monitor trends and receive feedback on the impact of the Medellín Model.

6. Integral Urban Projects

Integral Urban Projects (PUIs) combine the localization of security and provide social opportunity to Medellín's citizens.[249] PUIs include parks, libraries, schools and metrocable transportation systems, which provide open and safe areas to facilitate social interaction and access to services.[250] Included in the plan to increase security through PUIs, nearby police Centers for Immediate Attention are constructed as well.[251] PUIs provide opportunity for positive interaction between the police, state, and local citizens. Secure areas and PUIs include the participation of private businesses, and thus far, over 350 large- to small-sized companies are participating.[252]

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[245] Bonnilla and Palma, "Strategy for the Territorialization of Security. Making Medellín Safer: Together We Can," 57.

[246] Ibid., 63.

[247] Ibid., 64.

[248] Ibid.

[249] Ibid.

[250] Ibid.

[251] Ibid.

[252] Ibid., 67.

The need for PUIs came from the way the city grew more unbalanced and fractured over time both physically and socially.[253] The growth of violent groups in different sections of the city contributed to the breakdown of neighborhood ties throughout the city.[254] Before the mayor's office began the process of executing PUIs, it commissioned a study in 2004 that found that seven of the city's 16 *comunas* scored low on the HDI and QLSI.[255] These neighborhoods became the focus for PUIs "due to their dramatic social and economic conditions, their exposure to social exclusion and spatial segregation, and their predisposition to criminal activities and violence."[256] The PUIs create physical safe zones and an opportunity for positive interaction between the local citizens and the government.[257] PUIs are not under the sole direction of governmental experts, but instead, the local community plays a key role in the development and execution of PUIs.[258] PUIs incorporate management teams that combine the efforts of the national government, local government, community leaders, private businesses, NGOs, and international organizations.[259] Funding comes from local taxes, investments from private businesses, NGOs, and international organizations.[260] The mayor's office maintains transparency in how public funds are contributing to PUIs and their benefits, which may have contributed to "a 35% increase in taxes collected during the 2004–2007 period."[261] This increase resulted because local citizens where able to see how their money was being spent and how they are benefiting from it. In the most violent neighborhoods of Medellín, *Comunas* 1 and 2, PUIs helped create 125,000 square meters of public safe zones, four bridges to connect isolated communities, 14 parks, 3,439 new

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[253] Diana Puerta Osorio, "Integral Urban Projects: PUI's," in *Medellín Laboratory: An Exhibit of Ten Ongoing Practices*, ed. Miguel Mesa (Medellín: Agencia de Cooperacion e Inversion de Medellín y el Area Metropolitana, 2011), 71.

[254] Ibid.

[255] Ibid.

[256] Ibid.

[257] Ibid., 73–4.

[258] Ibid., 74.

[259] Ibid., 75.

[260] Ibid., 77.

[261] Osorio, "Integral Urban Projects: PUI's," 77.

jobs, 252 new businesses, increased health care coverage, and 98 percent school coverage of local youth.[262] PUIs are key structures of social urbanism that facilitate social inclusion and civic culture throughout Medellín.

7.   Human Rights Boards

Human Rights Boards (HRBs) that have been established in several *comunas* of the city and supported by the Medellín Model help to provide feedback to the police and local government about concerns of the local citizens.[263] The first HRB was created in *Comuna* 6 in 2010. It functions as a body that resists the exploitation of the local community by state and non-state actors.[264] Funding from the municipal level through the participatory budget process helps the Board to resist pressure from the state.[265] Even though HRBs help provide corrective feedback to the police, the police are not seen solely as adversaries.[266] The police are seen as key allies in bringing security to the neighborhood.[267] The HRBs also help coordinate public events that work to counter the influence of criminal organizations and legitimize the influence of the state.[268] HRBs are key to the Medellín Model because they ensure that local citizens have a voice and are able to provide feedback to improve the quality of its programs.

8.   Trends

In Medellín, concern has been raised that the reduction in violence that the city experienced in the early 2000s was not due to the Medellín Model, but rather a balance of power established by paramilitary leaders.[269] After one of the main leaders, Don Berna, was arrested in 2008, the homicide rate started to rise, but not to a level that was close to

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[262] Ibid., 77–8.

[263] Samper, "Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence," 20.

[264] Ibid.

[265] Ibid.

[266] Ibid.

[267] Ibid.

[268] Ibid., 23.

[269] Tubb, "Narratives of citizenship in Medellín, Colombia," 635.

the rate in the 1990s.[270] In just one year, "the homicide rate nearly tripled to 94.5 in 2009."[271] This rise was not permanent though because in 2012, the homicide rate had gone down to 52 per 100,000.[272] During this same time frame from 2008 to 2012, the city's Generalized Inequality Index (GINI) coefficient decreased 7.8 percent to 0.500.[273] The Medellin Model has had to shift the focus of its CEDEZO program from microbusinesses to building small and medium businesses.[274] It made this shift because it found that many microbusinesses tend to stagnate and never grow into small businesses.[275] Ebbs and flows will likely continue in the level of violence in Medellín. Although drugs, gangs, and violence will continue to be challenges in Medellín, the Medellín Model is a multi-faceted and responsive program to address insecurity.

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[270] Ibid., 637.

[271] Mark Mattaini, "Editorial: Cultural Analysis and Social Change in Medellín," *Behavior and Social Issues* 18 (2010): 2.

[272] Sotomayor, "Medellín: The New Celebrity?"

[273] Ibid.

[274] Milford Bateman, "Medellín Emerges as a Latin American Trailblazer for Local Economic Growth," *Guardian*, April 3, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/.

[275] Ibid.

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IV.   ANALYSIS OF THE TWO MODELS

This chapter provides an analysis of the similarities and differences between the two models, Medellín Model and UPP, to answer the author's research questions. It also looks at whether the hypotheses of this thesis are correct.

How different are the two models? How did they evolve? If they are indeed different, why did both cities adopt such different approaches to a similar challenge (public insecurity and crime)?

A.   DIFFERENCES

Both cities adopted their program to address a lack of security in their city, but chose a different approach. The UPP program appears to have two main pillars in the UPP itself and UPP Social, but the UPP units are the focus of the program. The police of the UPP are the first representatives of the state to enter the *favela* after the military and MP push out the gangs and make up a majority the government personnel working in the *favela*. UPP Social only leaves a few officials after the initial assessment of the community has been completed. The UPP program does not require the participation of locals to achieve its main goal and does not budget money for community leaders to be used toward their primary concerns. The program primarily pushes the criminals out of the area, but does not have the root causes of insecurity as its focus. The UPP program does address public security, but does it through police reform. This reform was developed and implemented from the regional level of government in the Public Safety Secretary's office for the state of Rio de Janeiro. The Medellín Model has a more balanced approach that seeks to address multiple areas of need to include social insecurity, physical insecurity, education, social cohesion, and economic insecurity. The Medellín Model seeks to address the underlying causes for crime and violence. The Medellín Model is focused on the needs of the city as a whole while the UPP program focuses on the *favelas* established throughout Rio de Janeiro. Medellín's public security program is being applied throughout the city and not just in a few neighborhoods like the UPP program. The Medellín Model comes from the bottom up because it was developed

and implemented by the mayor of Medellín's office, but it brings in funding and guidance from the state, national, and international levels.

B.   SIMILARITIES

Despite significant differences between the UPPs of Rio de Janeiro and the Medellín Model, the two programs are similar. They both prioritize physical security and have incorporated the use of police and military forces to confront violent illegal organizations. In the case of the Medellín Model, that experience was Operation Orion in 2002, which was before the development of the Medellín Model, but during UPP operations, this use of overwhelming force is used with each new *favela* where the UPP sets up operations. Prioritizing physical security makes sense when unarmed representatives, such as public works personnel, utilities employees, social workers, and educators, could be easily threatened and attacked by armed criminals. If unarmed representatives of the state are unable to perform their duties then the legitimacy of the state cannot be reestablished in a marginalized area.

Both Colombia and Brazil have police forces that struggle with corruption and human rights violations. The government in each country has tried to provide greater oversight and address these issues with limited success because each force maintains a level of autonomy from the national state. Colombia's police autonomy is tied to its long history of separation from political parties and the military, while Brazil's police autonomy is tied to its connection to the military and the military's ability to influence the national government. The record of human rights violations for each police force is tied to the nature of violent conflict they face. The police in Colombia must combat armed revolutionary forces like the FARC and ELN, paramilitary groups like the AUC, international drug traffickers, and local gangs. The police in Brazil must combat drug traffickers and local gangs, but also has as part of its history the experience of being used by the military dictatorship to suppress political opposition. On the Corruption Perceptions Index for 2015, Transparency International scores Brazil at 38 and a rank of

76 of 116 counties while Colombia scores at 37 and a rank of 83.[276] Tied to the police corruption in both Brazil and Colombia is the low wages that police receive and poor police oversight in each country. Each country has ineffective accountability organizations external to the police, such as the Ministério Público in Brazil, as well as Colombia's attorney general and inspector general of Colombia.

C.   TESTING THE HYPOTHESES

The first chapter hypothesized that different patterns of democratization have shaped and affected public security programs in both Brazil and Colombia, and that the philosophy of security in each city influenced how their respective public security program was structured and implemented.

The preceding discussions provided an analysis on how each program is different in the previous section titled "Differences." The two programs are different in what public security challenges they address, where in the city the program is implemented, how the program relates to the local community, and what level of government runs the program. The Medellín Model evolved out of the mayor's office attempt to address the lack of education, economic opportunity, safe community spaces, and presence of the state that was contributing to high levels of crime and violence around the city. The UPP program evolved out of the state of Rio de Janeiro's public safety secretary working to reintegrate the state back into the *favelas* of the city of Rio de Janeiro and to push the criminal gangs that controlled the *favelas* out. Looking at why Rio de Janeiro and Medellín adopted different programs confirms the author's hypotheses about their transition to democracy and security philosophy.

1.   Transition to Democracy

By looking at the history of each program, it was possible to see that the political opportunity structure present in each country influenced how each public security program was developed. First, remember that Fuentes defines the political opportunity structure by "the nature of the transition to democracy, access to the political system, and

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[276] "Table of Results: Corruption Perceptions Index 2015," accessed March 1, 2016, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table.

the structure of the police."[277] Just over 30 years ago, Brazil transitioned from an oppressive military regime that had been in power for over 20 years. The transition to democracy was slow and done at the pace set by the military, which allowed government officials involved in human rights violations to escape serious punishment and for the institutional structure and culture that was organized by the military to continue past the transition. The ability for the MP, which the UPP are structured under, to be tried in military courts instead of civilian courts for crimes, keeps the MP connected to the military and autonomous from civilian oversight. This autonomy gives the MP significant political influence, which is why as the UPP program was developed, it was able to exert influence over how it would operate. Since the MP was involved in the development of the UPP program, the police are the primary agents for executing the program. The UPP program is primarily police reform that focuses on physical security and pushing gangs out of the *favelas*.

UPP Social does address social needs, but it only goes into a *favela* once the UPP says it is safe to do so and only a few UPP Social officials are established in each pacified *favela*. Priority is given to reestablishing public services in the community, but not much is done to foster civil society or incorporate the public as a participating agent in the pacification process. The media does sound "fire alarms," which cover cases of corruption or expose police killings that occur under the UPP program, but the media tends to view the UPP positively.[278] The UPP is not accountable to the public in any significant way and a feedback process has not been set up as with the Medellín Model. Since feedback from the community has not been institutionalized into the UPP program, those living in the *favelas* have little recourse besides public protest. Even in pacified *favelas*, these protests can lead to violent suppression by the police. In 2014, a popular local dancer named Douglas Rafael Pereira da Silva was shot and killed during a police operation, which led to public outcry.[279] During the protest that followed, Edilson Silva

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[277] Fuentes, *Contesting the Iron Fist*, 6.

[278] "Bringing the State Back into the *Favelas* of Rio de Janeiro: Understanding Changes in Community Life after the UPP Pacification Process," 43–44.

[279] Amnesty International, *You Killed My Son: Homicides by Military Police in the city of Rio de Janeiro*, 77

dos Santos, who was unarmed, was shot in the head as police were firing at a crowd to disperse them.[280] The police officer accused of killing da Silva was charged with murder, but released from custody until the trial.[281] The police officer accused of killing dos Santos was charged by the Public Prosecution Service, but later, a criminal court judge who cited that self-defense was involved, dismissed the charges.[282] This resulting situation provides a stark example of the continued police impunity that still exists under the UPP program. In sum, media coverage and exposure of human rights abuses, does not result in responsive government.

Colombia transitioned to democracy from military rule almost 60 years ago. Not only was that period twice as long ago as Brazil's period, but military rule was also only for four years and was not marked by significant political oppression. Colombia also has a long history of international influence from the United States. The United States has supported the Colombian government's efforts to reestablish governance over areas controlled by the FARC and to eliminate coca agriculture through financial support, equipment support, and guidance.[283] To some extent, this continued U.S. influence has contributed to Colombia's early adoption of community oriented policing. Brazil does not share this same experience with international influence. Colombia's history has allowed the police to remain independent from the military, but connected to civilian institutions. The mayor of Medellín has the authority to provide guidance to the local police, which allowed the program to be developed by the mayor's office and to incorporate the police as a part of it rather than as the main actor. Thus, the Medellín Model was allowed to develop as a holistic approach to public security that addressed social needs, as well as physical security.

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[280] Ibid., 72.

[281] Ibid., 77.

[282] Ibid., 72.

[283] Patricia Weiss Fagen, "Colombia: Urban Futures in Conflict Zones," Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, last modified April 2015, http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/14ca3d69d21a09923a5be3c07f4f5287.pdf.

2. Philosophy

Brazil's disjointed police structure contributes to a lack of police accountability to the public and civilian authorities. The heritage of the military courts system and the weakness of other oversight mechanisms also contribute to police autonomy and a resistance to change. This lack of community influence on the police means that any type of police reform would have to come down from the political hierarchy rather than up from the community level. The UPP program developed its philosophy to appeal to the MP lobby and politicians because it needed their support to get the program implemented. This philosophy that developed was one that prioritized physical security, which contributed to the program's use of waves that included the use of overwhelming force first and addresses social issues last. Having physical security as its priority also means that the organization that is best set up to achieve the goal is the police and not government employees. The focus on utilizing the police is seen in the program's four basic goals:

> (1) police coercion was to be used against the armed criminal gangs that had taken control of certain "territories" (2) police activity was to be raised to a level where it was no longer worth engaging in criminal activities (3) the police were to be granted a permanent presence in pacified communities (4) support was to be given by the police for policies of social inclusion being introduced by other agencies.[284]

All the goals include the police as the primary agent for representing the state and for addressing the issues in the community.

The political autonomy of mayors in Colombia allowed Medellín's mayor to develop a program with the help of intellectuals and NGOs that focused on addressing social issues that contribute to crime and insecurity, such as poverty, lack of education, and marginalization.[285] This philosophy of improving public security by addressing the roots of public insecurity contributed to a program that relies on social programs and incorporates that police, but does not use the police as the primary agent of the state. The public is not just the focus of the program's implementation, but they are key participants

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[284] Carneiro, "The Politics of Pacification in Rio de Janeiro," 8.

[285] Gutierrez et al., "The Importance of Political Coalitions," 3139.

as well. The importance of incorporating the local community led to the development of LGCs, which bring the community into all aspects of implementing the program and even provide them with their own funds to address issues prioritized by the community.

D.   FINAL THOUGHTS

This thesis has shown how the nature of the transition to democracy and philosophy of security can influence how a public security program is developed and implemented. However, it is also important to look at what level of government has the political and economic capacity to develop a program. The UPP program was developed at the state level of government because that level of government is in charge of the MP. The Secretary of Public Security provides guidance to the MP and was the same office that developed the UPP program. The state level of Rio de Janeiro was also able to provide the funding to implement the program. Having the program come down from the state level to the city level gives it a top down structure. In Colombia, the mayor of Medellín is able to provide guidance to the local police and was able to use funds available from the state run utility companies to implement the program. Since the program comes from the city level and incorporates the local community as a key part of the process it can be seen as a bottom up program structure. Providing the community with the opportunity to influence the implementation and local direction of the program through the LGCs, HRBs, and participative budgeting keeps the focus of the Medellín Model at the community level.

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V.   CONCLUSION

This thesis provides a comparative analysis of the UPP program and Medellín Model to provide a better understanding of each program and how the transition to democracy and security philosophy influenced the development of the program. It found that in each country, the transition to democracy influenced the political and police structure, which influenced what part of the government had the political opportunity to institute reform. Brazil's transition to democracy allowed the influence of the military regime to continue in the country's institutions, as seen in the structure of the police and its lack of accountability to the government and the public. The influence of the police and its autonomy meant that it needed to be appeased during the development of public security reform, which caused the reform to be focused on the actions of the police who play the main actors in its implementation. The opening waves of the UPP program rely heavily on traditional policing measures, and it is not until physical security is established that community police by the UPP police begins. Social issues are not addressed until UPP Social is given clearance by the UPP to come into the community. The philosophy of pushing the gangs out of the *favelas* and prioritizing physical security keeps the focus of the program on policing and not addressing the social issues that may be contributing to the prevalence of crime in the city.

Colombia's transition to democracy left little remaining military impact on the government and its institutions. Having a military that was not intrusive into politics made it possible to have a police structure independent of the military and more subordinate to the government. Colombia still faces challenges of police accountability because of the weakness of its oversight institutions, but the government does not face opposition from the military in its effort to improve accountability. The mayor's office then had the political opportunity to create a program that incorporated the police, but did not make the police the main actor to obtain the support of the police. Since the mayor of Medellín was able to gather the guidance from academics and different organizations, he was able to create a public security reform program that addressed multiple issues of public insecurity simultaneously. The Medellín Model's use of LGCs, HRBs, and

participative budgeting incorporates the members of the community as key actors and provides a process for the community to provide feedback, and thus, improve the program.

Both Brazil and Colombia have tried to improve police accountability with limited success. For each public security program to have continued success, the police need to be held accountable to the public. The government of each country should continue to work to strengthen the authority of their accountability programs that are external to the police. In Brazil, the authority of the Ministério Público over the police could be increased so that it cannot be blocked by the police from doing its job. Bringing the MP under the authority of civilian courts and breaking its connection to the military would go a long way to limiting police impunity. In Colombia, it could increase the capacity of the inspector general to provide oversight by increasing its manning or by creating a subsection focused on the police. This new organization would need the funding, manning, and authority to investigate and discipline the police for it to be successful. Corruption in the police can also be addressed by improving wages and ensuring that continued professional training is provided.

The UPP program could be improved by incorporating some of the fundamentals of the Medellín Model, which would include increasing the capacity of UPP Social and increasing community involvement. Creating LGCs that have the ability to influence the focus of UPP Social in that community could be a positive step. Providing the LGC with independent funds would allow it to address its priority concerns instead of having to accept the focus that UPP Social decides upon. To see lasting gains, the UPP program needs to continue to address the roots of public insecurity instead of primarily pushing criminals out of one *favela* and into another. The program needs to continue to expand to new communities and work to transition gang members to legitimate activities. It can be done by providing education and economic opportunity as in the Medellín Model's Peace and Reconciliation Program. The UPP program should not just increase the cost and risk of being a criminal, but also increase the incentives for being a law abiding citizen, which creates a push and pull effect toward legitimacy for those involved in criminal activity. The UPP program needs to provide a way to reduce the number of gang members instead

of moving them out of one community to the next. Increasing the avenues for local citizens to provide feedback to the program and being responsive to it will allow the program to improve over time and adapt to unforeseen challenges.

There is room for further study within the cases presented by this thesis and other cases. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, an even more in-depth study and analysis of Brazil and Colombia could provide better insight into how their transition to democracy and public security philosophy influenced their respective programs. Examining other countries, such as Argentina or Chile, could help show whether this thesis's hypotheses hold true with other cases. Seeing the impact of each country's democratic transition on its public security reform illustrates how a country's military regime can leave a long-lasting influence and the importance of supporting democratic consolidation.

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